I. INTRODUCTION
Professor Barton L. Ingraham opened an illuminating debate about fundamental legal principles usually assumed to be at the bedrock of American democracy in his reply 1 to my article in this journal. My article described how England's new limits to the right to silence allow judges and juries to consider as evidence of guilt both a suspect's failure to answer police questions during interrogation and a defendant's refusal to testify during trial. 2 Proponents of this new law argued that it would "dissuade offenders from thwarting prosecution simply by saying nothing," force suspects to confess, increase convictions, and thereby reduce crime. 3 Opponents countered that even the innocent may "have valid reasons for remaining silent, and that the proposal would not reduce crime, but rather would increase the likelihood of coerced or false confessions and erroneous convic- (1) judges andjurors may draw adverse inferences when suspects do not tell the police during interrogation a fact relied upon by the defense at trial if, under the circumstances, the suspect could have been expected to mention the fact; (2) if the accused does not testify, judges and prosecutors may invite the jury to make any inference which to them appears proper-including the "common sense" inference that there is no explanation for the evidence produced against the accused and that the accused is guilty, (3) judges and jurors may draw an adverse inference when suspects fail to respond to police questions about any suspicious objects, substances, or marks which are found on their persons or clothing or in the place where they were arrested; and (4) judges andjurors may draw adverse inferences if suspects do not explain to the police why they were present at a place at or about the time of the offense for which they were arrested. Id. at 403-04 (internal citations omitted).
tions." 4 Opponents also argued that the new limits to the right would "undermine the presumption of innocence and erode England's accusatorial system of justice." 5 Along with others, I argued that limiting the right to silence would have significant effects on the accusatorial system ofjustice because the right exists to stall the engine which drives the inquisitorial system-the power to encourage, require, or force individuals to answer to government questioning. By adopting the use of adverse inferences from the refusal to speak, England has curtailed the right to silence and replaced it with a duty to talk. In doing so, England has stepped back toward an inquisitorial system, a retreat which will affect not only the criminal justice system but also the character of the relationship between the citizen and the state.
Professor Ingraham disagreed, and took issue with the key elements of the accusatory system of justice-the presumption of innocence, the right to silence, and the burden and standard of proof. For Professor Ingraham, it is "no longer clear" that the hazard of criminal sanction is still sufficiently severe to require the protections of the accusatorial system. 6 He seeks to ensure that suspects and defendants honor a proposed moral duty to talk. 7 Professor Ingraham's reply echoes themes from his previous writings. He has argued that the accusatorial criminal justice system is a "circus of illusions and deception" 8 and a "perfect tool for keeping facts out of sight." 9 He has also argued No. 10 (1993) . Reasons for silence include "the protection of family or friends, a sense of bewilderment, embarrassment or outrage, or a reasoned decision to wait until the allegation against them has been set out in detail and they have had the benefit of considered legal advice." 1993 REPORT, at 52.
5 O'Reilly, supra note 2, at 403 (citing Michael Zander, Editorial, Abandoning an Ancient Right to Please the Police, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Oct. 6, 1993, at 25 (the right to silence is "based on the presumption of innocence, and reflects the burden thrown on the prosecution to prove the defendant guilty, without any assistance from the defendant if he so chooses"));JohnJackson, Inferences from Silence: From Common Law to Common Sense, 44 N. IRELAND LEGAL Q. 103, 108 (1993); O'Reilly, supra note 2, at 403, n.8 ("The use of adverse inferences after the prosecution has established only a prima facie case shifts a burden to the accused to testify or have his silence aid the prosecution in carrying its burden of proof. This violates the accusatorial principle that it is the prosecution's duty to prove the accused's guilt."); Editorial, The Right to Silence, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 29, 1994, at 17 ("taking issue with the move to curtail the right to silence, arguing that it is an assault on the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof"). 6 Ingraham, supra note 1, at 575. [Vol. 87
REPLY TO INGRAHAM
that "American lawyers" perpetuate "myths" about the system, namely that judicial independence protects the citizen against overreaching government, that the adversary system utilizes neutral magistrates in a contest from which the truth emerges, 10 and that official power must be checked to assure liberty." He has referred to the American distrust of leaving "too much to the discretion of officials" as "American parochialism," 12 and dismissed distinctions between legal systems-including those of totalitarian regimes-regarding the value they place on the protection of the innocent from conviction.1 3 The stark contrast between Professor Ingraham's views and my own may help to clarify why American lawyers believe and practice as we do, and why we have not only a tradition supporting the right to silence, but a commitment to it as a primary value in our jurisprudence. While English proponents of limiting the right to silence offered in trade the dubious promise of reduced crime, Professor Ingraham offered only a moral justification. He made light of any competing concerns, such as the risk that more innocent people will be convicted of crimes, or that the change may increase state power at the expense of individual liberty. In advocating a duty to talk, Professor Ingraham minimized its significance, contending that I offered "patently untrue" or "unverified statements" about the significance of the new law. 14 While he questioned the value of the accusatorial system and suggested that it should be diminished, he asserted the new law does not move the Englishjustice system from the accusatorial towards the inquisitorial model, and argued that I perpetuated "myths" about the accusatorial and inquisitorial systems. 15 In addition to defending England's new law, Professor Ingraham offered his own proposal for, among other things, imposing a duty to talk and reducing the standard and burden of proof. 16 He conceded that his proposal would "require the revision of the American presumption of innocence doctrine and the overruling of a whole series of Supreme Court cases, and therefore, it may strike the reader as a purely academic exercise." 17 It so strikes this reader. My response deals with Ingraham's defense of the new English law, his critique of my article, his dismissal of the need for the protections of the American accusatorial system of justice and his unconvincing justification for a duty to talk. Professor Ingraham's attempt to make a duty to talk seem benign by diminishing its significance and blurring the distinctions between accusatorial and inquisitorial systems requires this reply, for as Justice Bradley warned "illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure."' 8 II. Do WE STILL NEED AN ACCUSATORY CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM? Professor Ingraham argued "for treating criminal and civil cases more alike procedurally than they traditionally have been" 19 because "rationalizations" 20 for the procedural differences cited by the United States Supreme Court, such as "the stigmatizing effect of a criminal conviction," and the "nature and severity" of the criminal sanction, Professor Ingraham found it "very unlikely" that "this situation ... has changed much in the decade following publication of these statistics." 24 He is wrong to believe that, because parole is more common than prison, the severity of American criminal sanction is somehow diminished. Imprisonment was not "rare" in 1985, and it has escalated dramatically in the last decade. The available current data reveals that, at the end of 1994, 1.5 million people were behind bars in America. Of these, most-958,704---were in state prisons, 95,034 were in federal prisons, and 483,717 were in local jails. 25 One year later nearly 1.6 million people were behind bars, with 1,078,357 in state and federal prisons, an increase of 8.7 percent; and 507,044 in 22 Id. at 574. 23 Id. at 574 n.37. Relying on 1983 figures, Professor Ingraham found that the average sentence for serious felonies was between about three and six years, while the actual time prisoners served "was, on the average, much less than these figures would indicate." 3 0 He concluded that "[1] ong-term imprisonment is also rare, although it has become more frequent in the last few years." 3 ' Professor Ingraham is wrong: longterm imprisonment is far from rare. The Department of Justice reported that from 1992 through 1994 the average person convicted of a violent offense was sentenced to ten years in prison and would serve slightly less than five years in prison. 3 2 In 1991, thirty-four percent of American inmates were serving sentences of at least ten years, and another six percent were serving either life or death sentences. In England and Wales, by contrast, only four percent were serving sentences of ten or more years, and an additional eight percent were serving life sentences. 3 
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eliminate the differences in time served, 3 4 and these statistics are from before the "truth-in-sentencing" laws went into effect and dramatically increased the time actually served in American prisons. 
526
[Vol. 87 sertions will be difficult to measure, unless Professor Ingraham specifies the dividing line between "lower class" and the "higher ranks." Moreover, it is plain that the average lay person would not find it easy to seek ajob as a felon, or enjoy the "celebrity" of being known as the felon next-door in the average American neighborhood. One could experience the more extreme forms of stigma by registering under one of the nation's many new sex offender registration and community notification laws. 43 III. INGRAHAM'S PoLL-DEvrED MoRAL "DUr TO TAiK"
In seeking to eliminate crucial elements of the accusatorial system, Professor Ingraham would replace the legal right to silence with a moral duty to talk. Professor Ingraham believes that a dichotomy exists between the morality of the American lawyer and the common man, arguing that the school-taught lawyers' "moral stance" is "alien" to the average lay person. 44 According to the lay person's "commonsensica" view, the best way to reach "fully informed decisions" is "by hearing from the defendant-" 45 give frank answers to relevant questions concerning a crime to police
46
While Professor Ingraham did not distinguish between a moral and a legal duty, English precedent has held that even if there were what some consider a moral duty to talk, there is no such legal duty, and that "the whole basis of the common law is that right of the individual to refuse to answer questions put to him by persons in authority 48 Ingraham, supra note 10, at 123 ("That such an order exists is the basic assumption of all social scientists, although few would be so bold as to claim all human laws must 1997]
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equally apparent to the layman and the lawyer, because "rules of justice and of good, are plain alike to simple and to wise." 4 9 To make the duty effective, there must be a sanction applied for its violation. Professor Ingraham agrees with the use of adverse inferences as the sanction so that the trier-of-fact may infer whatever is reasonable from "obdurate silence," including the inference that the suspect is "conscious of his guilt... because he has something to conceal... probably his involvement in the ... crime." 50 Professor Ingraham measured his lay person's morality (and perhaps natural law) by the unreliable yardstick of a 1993 Gallup Poll 5 ' which found, according to Professor Ingraham, that sixty-four percent of those polled strongly or somewhat agreed that a defendant should be required to prove his or her innocence, that fifty-six percent strongly or somewhat strongly disagreed that it is better to let some guilty people go free than to risk convicting an innocent person, and that seventy percent agreed that the criminal justice system makes it too hard for the police and prosecutors to convict people accused of crimes. 5 2 A 1991 Roper poll, however, found that fifty-nine percent of that sample thought-or opined-that the right to remain silent when charged with a crime should be guaranteed by the Constitution, while an additional twenty-five percent opined that it should be guaranteed by regular law but not by the Constitution. Only eleven percent opined that it should not be guaranteed at all. 5 3 That comes to eighty-four percent in favor of the right to remain silent. So much for a poll-derived moral consensus against the accusatory system of justice.
More important, polls are a dubious means of testing either morality or good sense, and are even of questionable value in gauging public opinion. While a poll may reveal the passions of the moment, public opinion changes. In 1991, polls indicated that George Bush's personal approval rating exceeded ninety percent. 54 The next year, he lost the election. The time a poll is taken may influence its results. [Vol. 87 528
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Indeed some polls are taken for the purpose of revealing the opinion of a particular moment, rather than a more general public opinion. This is the case in the poll cited by Professor Ingraham which was taken at the time the jury was selected in the federal trial of the police officers accused of beating Rodney King, and replicated questions used during jury selection. 55 The trial attracted great public attention and outrage, in part because the officers had previously been acquitted by a state court jury in Simi Valley. 56 The poll illuminated the passions of the moment feared by defense attorneys, who worried that at that particular time the public, and potential jurors, would be inclined to believe the criminal justice system had made it too difficult to convict the officers in the first case, require the officers to prove their innocence, and err on the side of conviction. 57 It is ironic that Professor Ingraham used questions aimed at eliminating the passions of the moment from the officers' trial to justify tailoring the entire criminal justice system to fit those passions.
Polls can also be inadvertently or intentionally manipulated by pollsters, or by those who cite them. 5 8 Professor Ingraham, for instance, cited the Gallup poll to demonstrate that A majority of sixtyfour percent strongly or somewhat agreed that a defendant should be required to prove his or her innocence. It is a dubious practice, however, to reach a majority by adding those who only somewhat agreed with the proposition to those who strongly supported it. Given only a choice to support or oppose the proposition, a majority might have opposed it. Such a choice was not given in the poll cited. The actual poll reported that forty-five percent-a minority-strongly agreed with the proposition, while nineteen percent somewhat agreed. 59 While Professor Ingraham contended that a majority of fifty-six percent strongly or somewhat strongly disagreed that it is better to let some guilty people go free than to risk convicting an innocent person, the actual poll reported that only about one-third of those polled, thirty-four percent, strongly disagreed, while twenty-two percent somewhat agreed. 
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Moreover, there is no gauge of the extent to which opinions reflected in a poll might be trivial and uninformed. 6 1 Most polls measure uninformed or unformed opinions. Studies aimed at gauging deliberate, informed opinions indicate that people subjected to intense education on an issue often change their opinions. In Britain, for example, after being informed about the issue, the percentage of persons believing that suspects should have the right to remain silent under police questioning rose from thirty-six to fifty percent. 6 2 Professor Ingraham bolstered his hypothetical lay person's case against the accusatory model by arguing that "[t] o the average lay person the allocation of proof in a civil tort or criminal trial makes no sense at all," a remark which he based upon his "more than twenty years ... attempting to teach American criminal law to college students .... -63 It seems a stretch, however, to judge as nonsense what fails to make sense to the average college student, no matter how superb their teacher.
IV. POLLS, MAJORITIES, AND CONSTITUTIONS
In-his enthusiasm for majorities, Professor Ingraham dismissedand missed-the point of a constitutional right, and the value of the experience of history, rebutting straw-man arguments which I never made in favor of the elements of the accusatory system of justice. 64 Dismissing these arguments, Professor Ingraham's idealized lay person concluded that "many of these doctrines make no moral or practical sense," and that the Gallup poll's lay person majority "is right and 62 Polling, Box Popui, ECONOMiST, July 27, 1996, at 73, 74. Ingraham contends that "It takes a considerable amount of sophisticated exegesis and constant repetition to convince the ordinary lay person of the rationality and morality of these viewpoints." Ingraham, supra note 1, at 560. Maybe a little education and deliberation would be enough.
63 Id. at 565 n.14. 64 Ingraham does not rebut serious justifications. Instead he characterizes arguments about tradition as "this is the way we have always done things in this country"; and "this way is hallowed in tradition, was instituted by our Founding Fathers in our Constitution." He characterizes arguments about authority as: "this way has been decreed by the Supreme Court of the United States"; or "bogus appeals to our xenophobia": "Our way stands in stark contrast to foreign methods of procedure and we all know what despots they are." Id. at 561. Constitutional lights protect individual liberty, often against the transitory whims of a majority. As Justice Brennan has noted, "the point of having a bill of rights supported by judicial review... is to... remove certain rights from the dailyjoust of politics, to protect minorities ... from the passions or fears of political majorities." 67 The effectiveness of constitutional rights hinges on the fact that they may be "amended only by supermajoritarian procedures.., and may not be brushed aside whenever a legislative majority deems them dispensable." 68 While to Professor Ingraham the courts have imposed straighjackets, Justice Brennan viewed the courts as a "calmer, cooler party to a dialogue from which the community benefits over time." 6 9
These views were echoed by Professor Donald Dripps, a Fifth Amendment skeptic, when he noted:
The conventional sources of constitutional law all point to a higher regard for the privilege than contemporary analysis can substantiate. The very point of a constitution is to prevent contemporary analysis from undermining those principles that are vulnerable to the recurrent pressures of the day, but nonetheless that have proved valuable by long experience.
70
This "American" attitude has gained widespread adherents in Britain, in a campaign for a "Bill of Rights for Britain." 71 V. Mn.IMIZING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF A DuTy TO TALK I believe that the new English law took a step back toward an inquisitorial system by imposing a duty to talk for a right to silence, and sanctioning failures to adhere to the duty with an inference of guilt. Professor Ingraham advocated the duty to talk, yet unconvincingly minimized its significance with arguments which include inaccurate characterizations of my position.
A.
A "MINOR CHANGE"
Professor Ingraham minimized the significance of the new English duty to talk, coyly characterizing it as only "minor procedural changes," 72 which "may prove to be inconsequential in practice," 78 
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and "hardly one that forces the defendant to abandon his silence." 7 4 In this he followed the lead of English proponents of adverse inferences (the accused's silence "will simply become an item of evidence ... scarcely a major infringement of a defendant's liberty.. . . ").75 Yet Professor Ingraham conceded the significance of the change, noting that I was "undoubtedly correct" from the American perspective in my contention that imposing a duty to talk and sanctioning silence violates the presumption of innocence. 76 He also conceded that his own plan to impose a duty to talk "may fly in the face of existing constitutional law" 77 and "require the revision of the American presumption of innocence doctrine and the overruling of a whole series of Supreme Court cases .... ,,78 Despite Professor Ingraham's attempt to down-play its significance, the whole purpose of adverse inferences is to discourage the use of the right to silence and to foster a to duty to talk. As Paul Kauper noted, an adverse inference from silence "brings a psychic pressure to bear on [the suspect] impelling him to speak ...
; in fact this pressure is the very object of this provision." 79
Professor Ingraham also contended that, because the new law will not meet its "crime control" goals of increasing the number of confessions or reducing crime, it cannot "produce a major change" in due process-"the burden of proof, presumption of innocence, and the accusatorial system of justice." 8 0 Yet, as the 1981 Royal Commission report and English commentators have pointed out, the new law will curtail the right to silence, reduce the burden of proof and erode the presumption of innocence. 8 [Vol. 87 
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innocence when he has no other extrinsic evidence (other witnesses, physical, demonstrative, expert and scientific) to offer in opposition to the state's case and when that case is strong enough to convict 8 2 In fact, the new law does not permit the suspect or the accused to avoid adverse inferences from his or her silence by offering the testimony of another witness. It requires the suspect or the accused to talk or face adverse inferences from silence. 8 3 Moreover, the adverse inference may be drawn, not only when the state's case is "strong enough to convict," but when the state has established a prima fade case.
B. THE BURDEN OF PROOF AND THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
In seeking to bolster his argument that the new law creates "no major change" in the burden of proof or presumption of innocence, Professor Ingraham rebutted exaggerated claims I never made, arguing, for instance, that the new law does not totaUy remove the presumption of innocence or convert the justice system from accusatorial to inquisitorial. 8 4 In the following three instances, he incompletely quoted my assertion, overlooked -support for it, -and erroneously termed it "patenty untrue" or "unverified":
(1) The new English law shifts the burden of proof to the accused by making them talk to the police during interrogation and then go forward with evidence through their own testimony... [or] the court will penalize them with an inference of guilt.
8 5 As the 1981 Royal Commission report noted, adverse inferences from silence "reverse the onus of proof at 82 Ingraham, supra note 1, at 591-92 (emphasis added). 83 Under the new law "if he chooses not to give evidence, or... refuses to answer any question" he faces adverse inference. O'Reilly, supra note 2, at 427-30, n.152 and accompanying text (citing The CriminalJustice and Public Order Act, 1994, Part III, § 35 (Eng.)). 84 Ingraham, supra note 1, at 593. Ingraham asserts that it "cannot be said that it [the new law] totally removes a presumption of innocence or converts the justice system from accusatorial to inquisitorial." Id, (emphasis added). Ingraham fails to page reference my article, because no such contention was made. I asserted that curtailing the right to silence and replacing it with a duty to talk would "undermine" the presumption of innocence and that with such a change, England "moved towards" an inquisitorial system. O'Reilly, supra note 2, at 445, 449. Again setting up a straw man, Ingraham says that the new law "does not shift the burden of proving all the essential elements of the crime from the prosecution to the defendant." Ingraham, supra note 1, at 590 (emphasis added). I made no such contention. 85 Ingraham, supra note 1, at 590 (citing O'Reilly, supra note 2, at 445; italics for omitted portions of assertion). I discussed support for this assertion, which includes the new law itself-"if he chooses not to give evidence ... or refuses to answer any question... 
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trial" contrary to the "golden thread" which runs through the English criminal justice system, that is, the requirement that "the prosecution prove the prisoner's guilt." 8 6
(2) Under the new law, if the prosecution establishes a prima facie case-even if it falls short of proof beyond a reasonable doubt-the accused will have to testify or the prosecutor's case will be bolstered by an inference of the accused's guilt. 8 7 (3) Adverse inferences undermine the presumption of innocence by forcing suspects to explain away their alleged involvement in a crime or face the inference that there is no explanation and that they are guilty.
8
Professor Ingraham quarreled with my analogy between adverse inferences and the confession pro confesso, 8 9 and asserted that suspects and the accused should not "have their silence treated legally as if it were tantamount to a confession of guilt." 90 Yet that is just what he advocated. If defendants, by remaining silent, fail to carry their new burden to present an explanation, the court may penalize them with an inference of guilt. This is a sanction which resembles the confession pro confesso, by which silent suspects were treated as if they had confessed. 9 1 VI. THE RIGHT TO SILENCE AND THE ACCUSATORIAL SYSTEM Professor Ingraham argued that in my article I perpetuated "myths" exaggerating the differences between the accusatorial and inquisitorial system, especially concerning the importance of the right to silence in the accusatory system, and the benefits that flow from
